Rejecting the Minority Discount by Heglar, Robert B.
NOTE
REJECTING THE MINORITY DISCOUNT
INTRODUCTION
At early common law, a holder of even a single share of a corpora-
tion's stock could veto any fundamental corporate change proposed by
other shareholders.1 Unlike day-to-day business decisions, which fell
within management's prerogatives, "fundamental" changes affected the
very nature of a shareholder's investment. In recognition of this effect,
courts would allow shareholders to singlehandedly prevent such
changes.2 This veto power preserved shareholders' expectations that the
characteristics of their investments would remain unaltered even at the
expense of economic efficiency and managerial authority.
The balance shifted, however, as corporate law recognized the im-
portance of maintaining a market for corporate control. Corporate regu-
lation began to encourage business leaders to enter new fields, acquire
other enterprises, and restructure investor rights.3 A sole dissenter's
power to halt a merger or stop a substantial sale of assets drastically
limited business leaders' ability to adapt to changing times. Thus, in or-
der to encourage mergers, acquisitions, and other forms of corporate re-
organization-all of which bring synergistic benefits to the business
community and ultimately to the public at large-courts and legislatures
eliminated the common law veto power.4
Minority shareholders are not, however, bound to accept such
changes without recourse. In most cases, a dissenting shareholder will
have an appraisal right, that is, a right to receive the "fair value" of her
1. 12B W. FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5906.1 (rev.
penn. ed. 1984), see Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941); Geddes v.
Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1921).
2. Courts once considered the veto power to be of constitutional magnitude: each share-
holder, they asserted, had a vested right to participate in the entity in which she originally invested.
See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 650 (1819); see also infra
notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
3. REVISED MODEL BusINESS CORP. Acr ch. 13 introductory comment (1984); see also
Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 1086-87, 133 N.W.2d 38, 42-43, modified on reh'g, 257 Iowa
1104, 136 N.W.2d 280 (1965).
4. See I F.H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLD-
ERS § 5.03, at 11-12 (2d ed. 1985).
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shares under a "dissenters' rights" statute.5 This right to an appraisal,
however, is normally a shareholder's exclusive remedy,6 unless she can
convince a court to set aside a transaction as unlawful or fraudulent.
7
Ideally, minority and majority shareholders will appraise minority
shares on their own." Only when the parties cannot agree will courts
step in to value shares.9 As the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
stresses:
The objective of [the Act's dissenters' rights provision] is to permit
each dissenter to receive fair value without the formality of judicial
appraisal, which involves delays and uncertainties and legal expenses
that are prohibitive to small investors. Appraisal is the ultimate sanc-
5. See infr notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
6. See, ag., REVISED MODEL BUSIESS CORP. AcT § 13.02(b). Twenty-six jurisdictions have
specific statutory limitations on a dissenter's recourse to other remedies if appraisal is available. See
REVISED MODEL BusINEss COR. Acr ANN. § 13.02 annot. (Supp. 1988) (listing twenty-five juris-
dictions with such provisions as of Nov. 30, 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 794-13.02 (Supp. 1988)
(similar provision effective Jan. 1, 1988). Even in the absence of a statutory provision, some courts
hold that shareholders who complain only of unfairness in a transaction have only the appraisal
remedy. See, eg., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714-15 (Del. 1983). Seegenerally Voren-
berg, Exclusiveness ofthe Dissenting Stocklolder's Appraisal Right 77 HARV. L REv. 1189, 1208-17
(1964) (discussing cases that hold the appraisal remedy exclusive).
In jurisdictions where the appraisal remedy is exclusive, courts should adjust appraisals, such as
by including any rescissory damages that minority shareholders prove, in order to protect such
shareholders from unfairness that falls short of fraud. See Thompson, Squeeze-Out Mergers and the
"New"Appraisal Remedy, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 415, 426 (1984) ("If courts intend to use appraisal to
enforce fiduciary duties and not just to check managerial incompetence, courts and legislatures
should adjust the standard for ascertaining value and the procedural requirements of the appraisal
process .... ).
7. See, eg., N.Y. Bus. CoRi. LAw § 623(k) (McKinney 1986) (appraisal remedy exclusive
"unless the action is unlawful or fraudulent with respect to the shareholder or the corporation",
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714 (court can fashion appropriate equitable or monetary relief "where
fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable
overreaching are involved"). Appraisal provides a concurrent remedy in these cases.
Other jurisdictions allow dissenting shareholders to bring parallel equitable actions to set aside
transactions or, alternatively, to claim rescissory damages if transactions are unfair or involve self-
dealing even if they are not necessarily fraudulent. See, ,,g, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 11.65(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1985) (equitable action warranted when "the action is fraudulent with respect to the
shareholder" or there is a "breach of fiduciary duty owed to the shareholder"); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13-A, § 909(13) (shareholder may file a "demand for payment of the fair value of his
shares"); Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 397 Mass. 525, 532-33, 536, 492
N.E.2d 1112, 1117-18, 1119-20 (1986) (allowing parallel equitable action when fiduciary duties are
violated, granting rescissory damages, Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099,
1104-05 (Del. 1985) (Weinberger, while broadly limiting collateral attacks on cash-out mergers, does
not require that plantiff who seeks to bring equitable action allege nondisclosure or misrepresenta-
tion). But see Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 1198, 1206-07, 1209-14, 729 P.2d 683, 690-91,
693-94, 233 Cal. Rptr. 249, 255-56, 259 (1986) (no parallel equitable action, despite breach of fiduci-
ary duty, where plaintiff knew of breach prior to merger). See generally 1 F.H. O'NEAL & R.
THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 5.32 (discussing split in judicial approaches).
8. Statutory provisions for cost-shifting may facilitate agreement. See Seligman, Reappraising
the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 829, 860-62 (1984).
9. REvISED MODEL BusiNEss COR. ACr § 13.30 (1984).
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tion to be invoked only when the parties fail to reach reasonable terms
of settlement.1°
Such statutes obviously favor negotiated valuation of shares. Pro-
moting such settlements in practice, however, requires clarification of the
valuation procedures that courts will apply when negotiation fails.
One aspect of valuation procedures that has confused courts and
added uncertainty to this area of law is the treatment of minority share-
holders' shares. In valuing noncontrolling shareholders' holdings, courts
generally calculate the pro rata value of the shares first and then, as a
second-stage adjustment, decide whether to reduce that pro rata value
because the minority shareholders lack corporate decision-making
power.11 This second-stage adjustment is known as a "minority dis-
count." Not all jurisdictions have yet taken a clear position on whether
or not to allow the minority discount, and those that have taken a posi-
tion are spit. Courts in Iowa, Kentucky, Oregon, and Missouri have
rejected the discount,' 2 while courts in Georgia, Indiana, Illinois, Kan-
sas, and Mississippi have allowed it.13 Since this is an area of law in
10. Id ch. 13 introductory comment.
11. See, e .g Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 169 Ga. App. 584, 587, 314 S.E.2d 245,
250 (1984); Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 461, 474-75, 630 P.2d 167, 177 (1981); see
also Comment, Valuing Closely Held Stock Control Premiums and Minority Discounts 31 EMORY
LJ. 139, 145 (1982) (minority discount is second-stage adjustment for valuing minority shares).
Courts that use only market price to calculate fair value do not make a second-stage adjustment,
because market price itself captures any difference between the prices of controlling and noncontrol-
ling shares See, e.g., AtlanticStates 169 Ga. App. at 589, 314 S.E.2d at 251; Moore, 6 Kan. App. 2d
at 474-75, 630 P.2d at 177; see also Krishna, Determining the "Fair Value" of Corporate Share; 13
CAN. Bus. L.J. 132, 168 (1987-1988) (use of publicly quoted stock prices implicitly discounts minor-
ity shareholdings).
12. See, ag., Richardson v. Palmer Broadcasting Co., 353 N.W.2d 374, 379 (Iowa 1984) (inter-
preting statute requiring payment of "fair value"); Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 1088-89,
133 N.W.2d 38, 44 (1965) (interpreting renewal statute requiring payment of "real value"); Ford v.
Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Ky. CL App. 1982) (interpreting statute
requiring payment of "fair value"); King v. F.T.J., Inc., 765 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(same);, Dreiseszun v. FLM Indus., 577 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Mo. CL App. 1979) (same); Columbia
Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 94 Or. App. 195, -, 765 P.2d 207, 214 (1988) (same). The Ford court did
suggest, however, that it might use the involvement of a minority interest as a reason to "discard[]"
the investment value approach, which most often leads to pro rata valuations. Ford 639 S.W.2d at
556-57; see infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (defining investment value).
13. See, eg., Hernando Bank v. Huff, 609 F. Supp. 1124, 1126-27 (N.D. Miss. 1985) (interpret-
ing statute requiring payment of "fair value"), aff'd, 796 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1986); Perlman v.
Permonite Mfg., 568 F. Supp. 222, 233-34 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (applying statute requiring payment of
value of dissenting shares as determined by practice and procedure in conformity with state's emi-
nent domain laws), aff' 734 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1984); Atlantic States, 169 Ga. App. at 586, 314
S.E.2d at 249 (interpreting statute requiring payment of "fair value"); Independence Tube Corp. v.
Levine, 179 Ill. App. 3d 911, -, 535 N.E.2d 927, 930-31 (1989) (same); Moore, 6 Kan. App. 2d at
465-66, 630 P.2d at 171-72 (interpreting statute requiring payment of shares' "value").
Other courts' positions remain unclear. See, eg., Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137,
143 (Del. 1980) (no "rule of thumb" in valuing assets); Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 39 Del.
Ch. 76, 87, 159 A.2d 278, 285 (1960) (allowing 10% discount from average-investment-value multi-
MINORITY DISCOUNT
which the "only things certain are the uncertainty, the delay, and the
expense,"14 companies and shareholders everywhere will benefit from
recognition of a general rule on minority discounts as second-stage
adjustments.
This Note argues for general elimination of the minority discount as
part of the appraisal remedy, a rule that would best reconcile managerial
freedom and shareholders' expectations. The Note first describes the op-
eration of the appraisal remedy, emphasizing the flexibility of the "fair
value" standard. 15 In part II, the Note argues that the remedy in large
part aims to protect minority shareholders, and that a minority discount
undermines this important goal.' 6 The Note suggests in part III that,
concerns of fairness and minority protection aside, the discount proves
difficult to calculate and unnecessary for preserving managerial discre-
tion.17 Finally, in part IV, the Note argues that the market exception to
the appraisal remedy is compatible with pro rata valuation methods and
does not compel acceptance of minority discounts.' The Note concludes
that to remain sensitive to both the concerns of the appraisal remedy and
the need for managerial decision-making freedom, courts should reject
the minority discount.
I. THE APPRAISAL REMEDY
Many different types of corporate changes, including mergers, com-
pulsory share exchanges, sales or exchanges of assets other than in the
plier to account for such factors "is the lack of marketability of the stock, etc."); Tri-Continental
Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 526-528, 74 A.2d 71, 72-73 (1950) (value must be discounted
because difficulty shareholder faces in withdrawing his pro rata investment results in a "lower mar-
ket value of the common stock ih comparison with its net asset value"); American Gen. Corp. v.
Camp, 171 Md. 629, 637, 190 A. 225, 228 (1937) (stating that dissenter is entitled to his "aliquot
proportion," but not addressing whether that proportion involves minority discount).
If a corporation invokes the appraisal remedy to rebuff shareholders' demands for an involun-
tary dissolution, courts almost uniformly refuse to apply minority discounts. See, ,,g., Ronald v. 4-
C's Elec. Packaging, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 3d 290, 298-99, 214 Cal. Rptr. 225, 230 (1985); Brown v.
Allied Corrugated Box Co., 91 Cal. App. 3d 477,485-87, 154 Cal. Rptr. 170, 175-76 (1979); Raskin
v. Walter Karl, Inc., 129 A.D.2d 642, 644, 514 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (1987); Blake v. Blake Agency,
Inc., 107 A.D.2d 139, 149, 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 349 (1985). But see McCauley v. Tom McCauley &
Son, 104 N.M. 523, 535, 724 P.2d 232, 244 (Ct. App. 1986). The rationale against discounts in these
cases is, however, stronger. See infra note 63. But see Wyss, 94 Or. App. at -, 765 P.2d at 213-14
n.8 (dissolution cases relevant, since statutory standard is same as in minority discount cases).
14. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE LJ.
223, 233 (1962); see also Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 85 (1969) (uncertainty and exposure discourage
shareholders from invoking appraisal remedy).
15. See infra notes 19-48 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 57-98 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
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regular course of business, and certain amendments to articles of incor-
poration, trigger dissenters' rights statutes.19 In addition, corporations
may specify other triggering transactions by resolution or by provisions
in their bylaws or articles of incorporation. 20 When triggering transac-
tions occur, dissenters can seek protection under their state's dissenters'
rights statute.21
19. All jurisdictions specify merger as a triggering transaction, twenty-four jurisdictions spec
compulsory share exchange, forty-four jurisdictions specify sale or exchanges of assets, and twenty-
three specify certain amendments to articles. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 13.02
annot. (1984) (listing various jurisdictions' triggering transactions as of Nov. 30, 1987); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 794-13.02 (Supp. 1988) (specifying triggering transactions as of Jan. 1, 1988). A de facto
merger can also trigger the appraisal remedy. See, eg., Morley Bros. v. Clark, 139 Mich. App. 193,
195-96, 361 N.W.2d 763, 764-65 (1984) (granting appraisal remedy where stock values diminished
by corporation's issuance of 4009 more stock).
20. REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr § 13 .02(aX5) (1984). Eleven jurisdictions allow
corporations to specify triggering transactions for themselves. e eg., MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-
13.02 (effective Jan. 1, 1988), Seligman, supra note 8, at 833 (listing jurisdictions as of 1984). Share-
holders also seek appraisals in many contexts other than dissenters" rights litigation. See, eg., Quick
v. Campbell, 412 So. 2d 264, 266-67 (Ala. 1982) (contractual clause requiring corporate repurchase
of employee's shares), infa note 94 (discussing valuation of stock for estate and gift tax purposes).
When valuing shares that are subject to a stockholder agreement, courts should focus on the pre-
sumed intention of the parties. When making statutorily required valuations, courts should examine
legislative intent. See Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 169 Ga. App. 584, 585, 314 S.E.2d
245, 248 (1984).
21. &e ALA. CODE § 10-2A-163(e) (1987, ALAs A STAT. § 10.05.456 (1985); ARtz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10-0810) (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-26-1007(fXl) (1987y, CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 1304 (West 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 74-123-24 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-374(g)
(West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-373 (19Q1); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 607.247 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988), GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-251 (1982). HAWAIi
REV. STAT. § 415-81 (1985 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-81 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
para. 11.70 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-44-19 (Burns Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 496A.78 (West 1962); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6712(c), (e) (1981); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 271A.405 (Baldwin 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:131 (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 909 (1981). MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-208, 3-210 (1985);
MASS. GEN. L ch. 156B, 44 90-91 (1979); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 450.1767, .1768a (West
Supp. 1988), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.473 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989). MIss. CODE ANN. § 794-
13.02 (Supp. 1988). Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.405, .455 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1989); MoNT. CODE
ANN. § 35-1-812 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2080 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.510
(Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:82 (1987), NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:l 1-7, -8, (West
1969). N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-15-4 (1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623 (McKinney 1986); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-113 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-87 to -88 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.85 (Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1091 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989); OR. REV.
STAT. 4§ 60.587, .591 (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1988); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 7-1.1-74 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-11-270 (Law. Co-op. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. §§ 47-648, -50 (Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-23-102 (1988); TEx. Bus. CORP.
Acr ANN. arts. 5.12, .16 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1989), UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-76 (1987); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 200 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-739 to -740 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 23A.24.040 (1969 & Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-123 (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.72(6) (West 1957 & Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-504 (1977); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 14,
§ 1906 (1976); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 256 (1982).
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Most state statutes, along with the Revised Model Business Corpo-
ration Act, provide that shareholders who dissent from a fundamental
corporate change will receive the "fair value" of their shares if they com-
ply with certain procedural requirements. 22 The Model Act defines fair
value as "the value of the shares immediately before the effectuation of
the corporate action to which the dissenter objects, excluding any appre-
ciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action unless ex-
clusion would be inequitable. '2 3 Far from having a comprehensive
definition, "fair value" remains a construct that parties and courts can fill
with meaning. 24
Courts determine "fair value" under either the "Delaware block
method" 25 or under the more comprehensive valuation standard articu-
lated by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc 26
Under the Delaware block method, courts consider three aspects of a
corporation's value: market value, net asset value, and investment
value.27 Market value is the price at which willing buyers and sellers
would trade a corporation's shares.28 Net asset value states the value of a
corporation's shares as if the corporation ceased business, sold its assets
piece-by-piece, and divided the proceeds proportionately among its
shareholders. 29 This value reflects an appraisal of the items on a corpo-
22. Normally dissenters must (1) give advance notice that they intend to dissent, (2) refrain
from voting in favor of the corporate action, and (3) demand payment and tender their certificates.
See, eg., REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 13.20-.28. As the Model Act provides:
If a demand for payment under section 13.28 remains unsettled, the corporation shall com-
mence a proceeding within 60 days after receiving the payment demand and petition the
court to determine the fair value of the shares and accrued interest. If the corporation does
not commence the proceeding within the 60-day period, it shall pay each dissenter whose
demand remains unsettled the amount demanded.
Id § 13.30(a). Other statutes use such terms as "value," eg., KAN. STAT. ANN. 17-6712 (1981 &
Supp. 1987), or "fair market value," ag., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1301 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989).
23. REvIsED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.01(3); see infra note 43.
24. Id § 13.01 comment 3 ("The definition of 'fair value' in section 13.01(3) leaves to the
parties (and ultimately to the courts) the details by which 'fair value' is to be determined within the
broad outlines of the definition.").
25. See, eg., Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 1082, 133 N.W.2d 38, 40, modified on
reh'g, 257 Iowa 1104, 136 N.W.2d 280 (1965); Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 461,
466, 630 P.2d 167, 172 (1981); In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406
A.2d 54, 60 (Me. 1979).
26. 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (parties may prove value by any technique considered ac-
ceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court); see infra notes 37-43 and
accompanying text.
27. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 1975);
Libby, 406 A.2d at 60.
28. Hernando Bank v. Huff, 609 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 (N.D. Miss. 1985), aff'd 796 F.2d 803
(5th Cir. 1986).
29. 12B W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5906.14. Asset value might also be viewed in a broader
sense as "going concern" value. See Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 526, 74 A.2d
71, 72 (1950) (asset value states proportionate interest in a "going concern," not a liquidation value).
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ration's balance sheet, i.e., the difference between the corporation's liabil-
ities and its assets.3° Investment value, on the other hand, looks to the
future and measures a corporation's earning capacity:
Investment value is fixed in a two-step process. First, based on the
corporation's recent earnings history, an average annual earnings fig-
ure is calculated. In arriving at this figure, one must select a period of
years of sufficient length to assure an adequate data base .... The
second step... is to select a capitalization ratio, or earnings multiplier.
The product of the capitalization ratio and the average annual earnings
figure yields the investment value of the corporation .... 31
Depending on the circumstances, courts will give the three aspects
of a corporation's value varying weights.32 If an active market for a cor-
poration's shares exists; courts might use market value as the "fair value"
of minority shares.33 Courts would hesitate to consider market value,
however, in a case involving a thin market riddled with insider transac-
tions.34 In liquidation cases, courts would most likely look to net asset
value to ascertain fair value: upon liquidation, all shareholders are enti-
tled to receive ratable shares of a corporation's value and because liqui-
dation renders market price irrelevant and future earning capacity a
nullity, these measurements of value cannot contribute to a meaningful
30. See Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222, 223 (N.D. Ind. 1983). However, a
court can use other means to calculate asset value. See Seligman, supra note 8, at 847-49.
31. Libby, 406 A.2d at 65.
32. See, e,& Hernando Bank; 609 F. Supp. at 1127 (courts should examine variety of factors in
determining fair value); Libby, 406 A.2d at 60 ("The weighting of these interdependent elements of
fair value is more akin to an artistic composition than to a scientific process."); see also Note, Valua-
ion ofDissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes; 79 HARv. L REv. 1453, 1457 (1966) ("The ele.
ments of value must be weighed in different proportions, depending on the nature of the particular
firm, the industry in which it operates, general economic conditions, and other similar variables.").
33. 12B W. FLETcHER, supra note 1, § 5906.13; see, e.g., Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 32
Ohio St. 3d 397, 412, 513 N.E.2d 776, 790 (1987) (statute construed to define "fair cash value" as
market value where there is "significant trading activity"). But see Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 99
Or. App. 195,-, 765 P.2d 207, 212 (1988) (fair value encompasses more than market value even if
stock traded on national security exchange). This is especially true when state statutes call for a
determination of"market value" or "fair market value." See Libby, 406 A.2d at 60 n.5; Annotation,
Valuation of Stock of Dissenting Stockholders in Case of Consolidation or Merger of Corporation, Sale
of its Assets, or the Like, 48 A.L.R. 3d 430, 438 (1973).
Almost half of the state statutes contain a market exception to the appraisal remedy: they do
not allow valuation proceedings for shares of a publicly held company. REVISED MODEL BUsINESs
CORP. Acr ANN. § 13.02 annot. (1984). In these cases, legislatures have assumed that there is an
active and efficient market in the securities. Id; see infra notes 108-20 and accompanying text. But
see REVISED MODEl. BusINEss CORP. Acr ch. 13 (1984) (no market exception).
34. See eg., Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 352 (Del.
Ch. 1973) (market value too speculative to be included in valuation), aff'd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del.
1975); Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (market
value not considered where transactions in shares "were infrequent, not current and involved officers
of the [c]ompany"). But see Hernando Bank 609 F. Supp. at 1127 (market price "significant" de-
spite relatively thin trading consisting mostly of insider transactions).
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valuation. Absent liquidation, however, most courts give net asset value
little weight.35 Investment value is most important when the business in
question will continue as a going concern and no reliable market value
exists.36
Over the past few years, courts have moved from the Delaware
block, method to the more comprehensive standard established in Wein-
berger v. UOP, Ina 37 Under the Weinberger standard, courts must con-
sider "all relevant factors" in valuing shares; they may use any technique
that is considered acceptable in the financial community or is otherwise
admissible in court.38 Although the calculation still includes market
value, investment value, and asset value, it encompasses other factors as
well.39 The Weinberger court narrowly interpreted the language of the
Delaware dissenters' rights statute, which excludes from appraisal calcu-
lations any "value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of [a]
merger,"'4 as excluding only speculative elements of value arising from a
merger.41 This interpretation allows courts to consider all elements of
future value that are known or provable at the time of a merger.42 Fur-
thermore, Weinberger allows appraisal calculations to include rescissory
damages if such damages are "appropriate to all the issues of fairness." 43
35. See Hernando Bank, 609 F. Supp. at 1128 (rejecting net asset value approach); Libby, 406
A.2d at 66 ('Generally net asset value should not be heavily weighted in stock valuation unless the
valuation is being made for liquidation purposes."); see also Annotation, supra note 33, at 438 (net
asset or liquidation value rarely taken into account except as minimum value). See generally Selig-
man, supra note 8, at 848-50 (Delaware cases fail to define net asset value consistently); Note, supra
note 32, at 1460 (discussing application of net asset value).
36. Haynsworth, Valuation ofBusinessInteres 33 MERCER L REv. 457, 508-09 & nn.174-75
(1982).
37. 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983). In Weinberger minority stockholders of a corporate subsid-
iary attacked the validity of a merger with the subsidiary's parent corporation. Two of the subsidi-
ary's directors were members of the parent's board, and although they knew that the price offered
did not represent the best bid the parent would make, they failed to disclose this information to the
subsidiary. Id. at 707. The court noted that the subsidiary might have obviated the problem by
appointing a group of outside directors to negotiate with the parent at arm's length. Id at 709 n.7.
The court remanded the case to the chancery court to test the fairness of the S21 price by taking into
account all the relevant factors.
38. Id. at 713; see alo Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 139, 146-47, 486 N.Y.S.2d 341,
347-48 (1985) (listing several methods courts can legitimately use to determine "fair value").
39. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940 (Del. 1985) (Weinberger did not elimi-
nate the Delaware block approach, "only its exclusivity as a tool of valuation"), see also 1 F.H.
O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 5.31, at 194 (Weinberger approach is "more flexible" than
Delaware block method and allows appraisals to "more nearly accord with the real value of...
shares").
40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983).
41. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713; see also Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 571,
473 N.E.2d 19, 27, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 675 (1984).
42. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
43. Id. at 714; see also Herzel & Coiling, Establishing Procedural Fairness in Squeeze-Out Merg-
ers After Weinberger v. UOP, 39 Bus. LAw. 1525, 1531 (1984):
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As recent cases have indicated, the "fair value" standard used in
dissenters' rights statutes leaves courts plenty of discretion as they apply
the appraisal remedy.44 Without a comprehensive statutory definition of
fair value 5 courts valuing minority shares can look both to legislative
intent" and to general conceptions of fairness. 47 Courts should use this
broad interpretive authority to achieve just results in individual cases,48
but they can better achieve such flexibility by altering the mix of valua-
tion factors, not by applying a second-stage adjustment to minority
interests.
II. How THE MINoRITY DISCOuNT UNDERMINES THE PROTECTIVE
PURPOSE OF THE APPRAISAL REMEDY
A. Protecting Minority Shareholders' Expectations
The appraisal remedy should not penalize majority shareholders for
exercising majority rule and directing a corporation's business. Instead,
the appraisal remedy should focus on protecting minority shareholders'
legitimate expectations against majority oppression and management
misconduct. 49 In evaluating minority shareholders' expectations, courts
should consider the investment those shareholders have made in the cor-
poration at issue, as well as their entitlement to pro rata distributions
from the corporation.
1. A Historical Perspective According to the traditional ration-
ale, dissenters' rights legislation offers minority shareholders a quid pro
Rescissory damages essentially give a plaintiff the option of having the value of the stock he
has given up in the merger calculated either as of the time the damage award is made or at
the time of the transaction. In theory he is being given the option to take back his stock
and resell it to the defendant at current (date of the hearing) values or to take the value of
the stock at the time of the transaction.
44. See Note, Dissenting Stockholder's Right of Appraisal-Determination of Value, 28 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1953) (effectiveness of appraisal remedy depends on meaning courts give the
word "value").
45. See supra note 24.
46. See, e-&, Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 169 Ga. App. 584, 585-86, 314 S.E.2d
245, 248-49 (1984), Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 94 Or. App. 195, -, 765 P.2d 207, 214 (1988).
47. See Dreiseszun v. FLM Indus., 577 S.W.2d 902, 907 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (underlying
purpose of appraisal remedy is to give dissenters an "equitable, just, and 'fair value' "); cf. Sarrouf v.
New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 397 Mass. 542, 551, 492 N.E.2d 1122, 1129 (1986) (ap-
praisal is an equitable proceeding).
48. See Atlantic States 169 Ga. App. at 586, 314 S.E.2d at 249 (amorphous term "fair value" is
intended to allow flexible response to particular fact situations).
49. See Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. Ras. J. 875,
876-81 (from ex ante perspective, appraisal most useful when majority shareholders are more likely
to appropriate wealth from minority shareholders than to maximize corporate wealth).
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quo for the loss of their veto power over fundamental corporate change.50
Historically, minority shareholders could exercise the veto power to
block transactions that fundamentally altered their interest in a corpora-
tion.51 That power protected minority shareholders' original expecta-
tions regarding their shares-the risks they accepted and the nature of
the investment they planned to make.52 With the demise of the veto
power, majority shareholders could effect major corporate changes de-
spite minority objections. Although minority shareholders could no
longer stop objectionable transactions, dissenters' rights statutes gave
them a right to withdraw their investments from a corporation on fair
terms, search for suitable places to reinvest their funds, and reassert con-
trol over the nature and risks of their investments. If they wanted in-
stead to assume the risks associated with the new venture planned by the
majority, they could simply accept the new securities that the majority
offered.
This background of the common law veto power, which vested sub-
stantial power in minority shareholders, has persuaded some courts to
exclude minority discounts from the current appraisal remedy. These
courts argue that a discount fails to honor minority shareholders' legiti-
mate expectations concerning the value of their investments. In Dreises-
zun v. FLM Industries, for example, the Missouri Court of Appeals
refused to discount the minority shares at issue, stressing that "this
Court recognizes that prior to the enactment of this 'judicial appraisal'
statute, the unanimous consent of all the shareholders in a corporation
was required to authorize the transfer of. . . assets." s53 Similarly, in
Woodward v. Quigley, the Supreme Court of Iowa disallowed a minority
discount, noting that the Iowa appraisal statute resembled statutes en-
acted "to modify the common-law rule which required unanimous con-
sent of all the stockholders for a substantial change in the corporate
structure."5 4
Courts that view the appraisal remedy as a quid pro quo for the veto
power do not presume that shareholders' investments will remain static;
they recognize that contemporary investors anticipate changes in their
50. Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941); Chicago Corp. v. Munds,
20 Del. Ch. 142, 149, 172 A. 452, 455 (1934).
51. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
52. Id
53. 577 S.W.2d 902, 907 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); see also Flarsheim v. Twenty Five Thirty Two
Broadway Corp., 432 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Mo. 1968) (warning against "weaken[ing] or fritterfing]
away by construction the protection given minority shareholders in exchange for dispensing with the
necessity of securing unanimous consent of the shareholders for the sale of... assets").
54. 257 Iowa 1077, 1086, 133 N.W.2d 38, 42, modified on reh', 257 Iowa 1104, 136 N.W.2d
280 (1965).
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investments.55 These courts therefore seek to uphold legitimate expecta-
tions of fair dealing and full disclosure, not outmoded expectations of
corporate immutability. 6 Under this approach, courts emphasize the
historical derivation of dissenters' rights statutes only to demonstrate
that legislatures have long attached importance to protecting the inter-
ests and expectations of minority shareholders.
2. Pro Rata Investment and Pro Rata Disbursement When
shareholders make pro rata investments in a corporation or construc-
tively contract to receive pro rata distributions some time in the future,
they legitimately expect to get pro rata value back.57 In closely held cor-
porations, one context in which the appraisal remedy takes on special
importance,58 shareholders often will have made pro rata investments at
start-up.59 Even if shareholders have purchased their shares in the mar-
ket, a pro rata division can still occur at some point in the future--either
completely, in a voluntary dissolution, or partially, through a distribu-
tion of dividends.6°
When a ready market value is unavailable, a court applying the ap-
praisal remedy can determine fair price under a net asset value approach
by dividing the greater of a company's going concern value or its liquida-
55. See, eg., Hariton v. Arco Elecs., 40 DeL Ch. 326, 332, 182 A.2d 22, 26(1962) (shareholder
anticipated having to accept "new investment"), aff'd 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (1963); see also
Folk, De Facto Mergers in Delwar- Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. REv. 1261, 1280-
81 (1963) (shareholders invest in continuous course of business that changes over time).
56. Most cases involving dissenters' rights state the rationale for such rights broadly. As the
Supreme Court stated in Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941) (emphasis
added):
At common law, unanimous shareholder consent was a prerequisite to fundamental
changes in the corporation. This made it possible for an arbitrary minority to establish a
nuisance value for its shares by refusal to cooperate. To meet the situation, legislatures
authorized the making of changes by majority vote. This, however, opened the door to
victimization of the minority. To solve the dilemma, statutes permitting a dissenting minor-
ity to recover the appraised value of its shares were widely adopted.
57. See Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 94 Or. App. 195,-, 765 P.2d 207,212 (1988) (fair value
should reflect dissenters' loss of opportunity to share in corporate prospects).
58. Most close corporations escape the market exception to the appraisal remedy, see infra
notes 110-20 and accompanying text, because their shares are not generally traded in the securities
markets. FRL O'NEAL & R. THoMpsON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02 (3d ed. 1987).
59. This fact counters the argument, made by some courts and commentators, that minority
shareholders awarded pro rata value receive something for which they have not paid. See, eg.,
Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 169 Ga. App. 584, 589, 314 S.E.2d 245, 251 (1984) (valua-
tion process focuses on value of stock held by dissenting shareholder, not on percentage of corporate
worth); cf Seligman, supra note 8, at 848 (dissenter entitled to proportionate interest in "going
concern," not proportionate interest in liquidation value).
60. To the extent that market price does not reflect a minority discount, such shareholders are
in a position identical to the position of shareholders who make pro rata investments at start-up. See
infra text accompanying note 120.
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tion value equally among all shares.61 This method of valuation con-
structively dissolves the company: the minority shareholders receive a
share of the corporation equal to what they would receive if the whole
enterprise were dissolved (either sold as a going concern or liquidated)
and a new enterprise begun. Constructive dissolution comports with the
traditional view of equity securities, according to which each share of a
corporation represents a pro rata interest in the corporation's assets and
going concern value. As one court said of this traditional view: "A com-
mon stockholder is an owner of the enterprise in proportion that his
stock bears to the entire stock and ordinarily he is entitled to participate
in the management, profits and ultimate distribution of assets of the cor-
poration." 62 Further, to the extent that shareholders' expectations fol-
low this traditional view, constructive dissolution fulfills those
expectations.
In fact, however, courts too often ignore the possibility of pro rata
distribution except in extraordinary circumstances, such as when share-
holders' proposed course of action will lead to a voluntary or involuntary
dissolution. 63 Courts should recognize that receiving pro rata value and
obtaihing pro rata disbursements are legitimate expectations that must be
upheld. Any other approach to valuation in effect awards majority
shareholders a control premium.64
61. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Courts can use this approach even under the
Weinberger valuation standard. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
62. See Dreiseszun v. FLM Indus., 577 S.W.2d 902, 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting 18
CJ.S. Corporations § 216, at 648 (1939)).
63. In some states, a corporation, a majority shareholder, or any other shareholder may elect to
buy out a shareholder who has filed a petition of dissolution; the price of such a buy out is the fair
value of the shareholder's shares. See, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1989);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1118(a) (McKinney Supp. 1989). The California provision instructs courts
to determine fair value "on the basis of the liquidation value as of the valuation date but taking into
account the possibility, if any, of sale of the entire business as a going concern in a liquidation."
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000(a). The New York statute instructs courts to find only the fair value of
the shares in question. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1118(b).
In dissolution cases, strong reasons support the use of pro rata value without a discount for
minority shares. A minority shareholder seeking dissolution claims that majority shareholders have
engaged in some unfair, possibly tortious, action. If the minority shareholder succeeds in having the
company dissolved, all shareholders will receive their pro rata share of the assets, with no account
given to the minority status of their shares. Minority shareholders should not receive less than this
value if, instead of fighting the dissolution action, the majority decides to seek appraisal of minority
shares in order to buy out the minority and reduce corporate discord.
Even though the rationale against discounting is very strong in dissolution actions, the same
potential for realizing a corporation's pro rata value inheres in any dissenters' rights situation.
Although the possibility of dissolution may be more attenuated, courts nonetheless should recognize
that such a possibility exists.
64. Some commentators have argued that a company should recover any premium over market
value paid to a controlling shareholder and treat that premium as a corporate asset. See A. BERLE
& G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORArION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 243-44, 247-49 (1932). If
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B. Protecting Minority Shareholders from Unfairness
The appraisal remedy has the virtue of protecting shareholders' ex-
pectations regarding the nature of stock ownership and their shares' sub-
jective value.6 In addition, it provides a "net of protection" against
unfairness that falls short of triggering other remedies available to share-
holders and deals with situations in which shareholders forgo such reme-
dies.66 In interpreting appraisal statutes, courts must extend this net of
protection to minority shareholders facing new challenges, such as cash-
out mergers.
1. Voluntariness Minority shareholders resort to the appraisal
remedy partly as the result of coercion. In some cases, minority share-
holders have a limited choice between joining a fundamentally trans-
formed venture or leaving the corporation; in others, a merger-plan or
compulsory share acquisition statute requires them to relinquish their
shares. 67 When minority shareholders sell their shares on the market,
they clearly choose the market price over an interest in the corporation,
even if that market price in some way discounts the value of their shares.
Dissenters, on the other hand, do not voluntarily enter the market and
should not have to endure its vagaries. Rather, they should receive every
benefit of the doubt regarding the value of their shares.6
courts accepted this "activist" remedy, then they would certainly use pro rata value when applying
the more passive appraisal remedy. Se, eg, Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., 91 Cal. App. 3d
477, 487 -. 8, 154 Cal. Rptr. 170, 176 n.8 (1979) (many commentators believe that courts should
treat control premiums as a corporate asset).
65. See Jones v. HLF. Ahmanson& Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 117,460 P.2d 464,478, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592,
606 (1969) ("Appraisal rights protect the dissenting minority shareholder against being forced to
either remain an investor in an enterprise fundamentally different than that in which he invested or
sacrifice his investment by sale of his shares at less than a fair value.").
Current market prices normally induce only a small percentage of a total body of stockholders
to selL It is impossible to know what value shareholders place on retained shares and, consequently,
the average subjective value of all shares outstanding. A truly accurate average valuation of shares
would thus exceed the current market price. See Kanda & Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the
Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. Ray. 429, 437-48 (1985) (because all shareholders do not
"'appreciate' their shares identically," market price "understates their average valuation").
66. See State ex reL Robbins v. Shellsburg Grain & Lumber Co., 243 Iowa 734,739, 53 N.W.2d
143, 145 (1952) (statute's purchase clause intended to protect minority shareholders against "rough-
shod tactics upon the part of a majority group"); Raskin v. Walter Karl, Inc., 129 A.D.2d 642, 644,
514 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (1987) (stating, in involuntary dissolution case, that appraisal statutes are
designed "to protect a minority shareholder from any unjust exercise by the majority shareholders of
their greater power").
67. See eg., MD. Coams. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-105 (1985). See generally 1 F.H. O'NEAL
& R. THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 5.07 (describing procedure for computing share exchanges).
68. See Haynsworth, supra note 36, at 459; Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 94 Or. App. 195, -,
765 P.2d 207, 214 (1988) (dissenters who have little choice but to exercise their statutory rights
would not be adequately protected by market value approach).
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Minority shareholders "cashed out" by the majority are particularly
vulnerable to coercion. In this type of fundamental corporate change,
minority shareholders cannot choose between taking part in a new ven-
ture or receiving the fair value of their shares. When majority sharehold-
ers approve such a transaction, management can pay the minority with
cash or non-equity securities and refuse to issue shares in any new corpo-
ration that results from the transaction. 69 The choice whether minority
shareholders will remain part of a new enterprise shifts from minority to
majority, and the appraisal remedy must then set the minimum price at
which the transaction can proceed. 70
The coerciveness of this shift of choice increases the potential for
abuse and calls for the same type of solicitude given to minority share-
holders' expectations about the fundamental character of their invest-
ments. Here the protection is not absolute-the cash-out will proceed-
but the price of the merger's consummation will be the return of the
minority's pro rata value in the corporation. This guarantee of pro rata
value serves the interests of corporate democracy by granting the minor-
ity greater bargaining power, counterbalancing the majority's ability to
set an initial price for the minority shares. In a properly functioning
dissenters' rights process, the parties' negotiations will lead to a compro-
mise cash-out price somewhere between the corporation's offer and the
higher appraisal price. 71
2. Minority Shareholder Oppression. Minority shareholders do
not seek appraisal just because the nature of their investment has
changed. They will resort to the unwieldy and costly appraisal remedy
only if they perceive that the majority has acted unjustly,72 such as by
offering a price significantly below the value of the minority's shares or
by causing a decline in the value of those shares. Although legislatures
69. See 1 F.H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 5.04, at 22-23.
70. Id. § 5.28, at 170, see also In re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd., 1984 Ch. 419, 430 (stating, in
regard to minority oppression remedy under English Companies Act, 1980, § 75, that "it woild not
merely not be fair, but most unfair, that [a minority shareholder] should be bought out on the
fictional basis applicable to a free election to sell his shares").
71. The high cost of seeking an appraisal remedy, see infra note 72, induces a minority share-
holder to negotiate with a majority rather than pressing for a court appraisal that would net only a
slightly higher pro rata value.
72. Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 85. Minority shareholders who seek an appraisal remedy risk
accumulating a large bill for attorneys' fees and expert witnesses. 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1,
§ 7165 (1983). For example, the Weinberger court denied the plaintiffs costs for depositions, travel
and other expenses. Weinberger, 517 A.2d at 656; see also Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d
1198, 1219-20, 729 P.2d 683, 697-98, 233 Cal. Rptr. 249, 262-63 (1986) (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
(appraisal remedy ineffective because of its complex costs and procedures); Seligman, supra note 8,
at 856-64 (arguing that appraisal procedures are mostly unnecessary and that risk of bearing court
costs and appraisers' expert witnesses' and attorneys' fees is unreasonable).
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did not design the appraisal remedy to counter "fiduciary misbehav-
ior,"73 oppressed minority shareholders may find an appraisal the only
or, at best, the least dangerous remedy available.74 Thus, minority share-
holders invoke the appraisal remedy in part because of necessity.
The appraisal remedy combats two types of minority oppression:
(1) discernible corporate misbehavior in such transactions and (2) gen-
eral unfairness in the minority/majority relationship that is difficult to
prove or expensive to litigate.75 Both of these forms of oppression con-
flict with the fiduciary duties that majority shareholders owe minority
shareholders under state laws; they also reduce minority share prices by
diverting corporate benefits to the majority.76
Fiduciary obligations limit majority shareholders' ability to act to
the detriment of a corporation77 and its minority shareholders,78 or to
divert corporate opportunities79 and thereby enhance the value of major-
73. Brudney & Chirelstein, FairShares in Corporate Mergers and Takeover 88 HAv. L. REV.
297, 304-07 (1974).
74. See. ag Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 94 Or. App. 195, -, 765 P.2d 207, 214 (1988)
(statutory remedy most viable option for dissenter);, see also supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text
(discussing exclusivity of appraisal rights). Even if collateral action could remedy specific instances
of fiduciary breach, general unfairness in the minority/majority relationship will persist. See infra
note 76 and accompanying text One option available when the corporation itself has been
harmed--the derivative suit-is fraught with complications. Standing requirements, indemnification
provisions, and other impediments seriously limit the likelihood that a derivative suit will result in a
net gain for the company. See generally D. DEMorr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATivE ACTIONS (1987)
(comprehensive discussion of substantive and procedural aspects of derivative suits).
75. By denying a minority discount in cases of oppression by majority shareholders, courts
protect minority shareholders in general by discouraging majorities from using oppressive tactics.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text; see also I F.L O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 4,
§ 5.31, at 194 ("[T]he danger of exploitation ... remains to the extent that legislators or the courts
do not adjust the valuation formula from time to time to reflect changing economic theories and
perceptions about intrinsic worth of stock."); Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 84-86 (appraisal remedy
forces management to formulate deal acceptable to large number of shareholders).
76. See Bradney, Effcient Markets and Fair Values in Parent Subsidiary Mergers, 4 J. CORP. L.
63, 69 (1978).
77. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175-76 (2d Cir.) (discussing fiduciary duties of
majority stockholder/director), cert. denied, 349 U.S 952 (1955).
78. See, eg., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108, 460 P.2d 464, 471, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592, 599 (1969) ("Any use to which [the majority shareholders] put the corporation or their
power to control the corporation must benefit all shareholders proportionately and must not conflict
with the proper conduct of the corporation's business."); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunbill Int'l,
Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 434 (DeL Ch. 1968) (stockholders who determine corporation's policies should
face duties and standards comparable to those imposed on directors); see also Note, Jones v. Ahman.
son: The Fiduciary Obligations of Majority Shareholders; 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1079 (1970) (discuss-
ing obligations that majority shareholders owe to minority shareholders).
79. See Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 972 (Del. Ch. 1985) (diversion of corporate opportunity
is "egregious breach of fiduciary duty"); Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 219, 222 N.W.2d 71, 78
(1974) (insider may not exploit his position by "appropriating to himself a business opportunity
properly belonging to the corporation").
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ity shares at the minority's expense.80 If valuation proceeds under the
assumption that the majority has complied with its state-law fiduciary
obligations, then any artificial price difference between majority and mi-
nority shares, which theoretically could support minority discounting,
should not exist.81
In discounting minority interests, however, several courts have ar-
gued that managerial control itself has value and that lack of it requires a
discounted market price. In Perlman v. Permonite Manufacturing Co.,
for example, a federal district court explained that since the minority
shareholders in the case could not force a liquidation or a declaration of
dividends and could not dictate or control corporate policy and opera-
tions, their shares were worth less than a pro rata interest in the corpora-
tion.82 In Moore v. New Ammest Inc, the Kansas Court of Appeals
stressed the importance of considering control of managerial decisions as
an element of stock value in appraisal proceedings.8 3 The economic real-
ity, according to these courts, is that a discount is warranted because
minority shareholders lack control.84
The real significance of managerial control, however, remains un-
clear. As one commentator has argued:
[No one] has attempted to explain why management power is inher-
ently valuable or why the market would place a premium on its owner-
ship. The usual explanation given really is only a recitation of the
various things that voting power entitles a control block owner to
do.... [This recitation] fails to explain why participation in manage-
ment is valuable apart from the fact that it enables one to affect corpo-
rate income and asset values. Any other inherent value of
management powers is not obvious. One is left with the feeling that
the inherent value deirives from prestige or other psychic benefits
which accompany power.85
80. The sale-of-control doctrine, which obligates sellers of controlling interests to investigate a
purchaser's financial position and future plans, also limits majority actions. See, g. Insuranshares
Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 27-28 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (sellers of controlling interest
failed to investigate purchaser adequately).
81. See Comment, supra note 11, at 146-54 (suggesting that courts' rationales for control pre-
miums and minority discounts are illogical, inconsistent, or incomplete).
82. 568 F. Supp. 222, 226 (N.D. Ind. 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1984).
83. 6 Kan. App. 2d 461, 474-75, 630 P.2d 167, 177 (1981).
84. Some courts that reject a minority discount still accept this reasoning. See, ag, Brown v.
Allied Corrugated Box Co., 91 Cal. App. 3d 477, 485-86, 154 Cal. Rptr. 170, 176 (1979) ("[A]
minority shareholder who brings an action for the involuntary dissolution of a corporation should
not, by virtue of the controlling shareholder's invocation of the buy-out remedy, receive less than he
would have received had the dissolution been allowed to proceed."); Woodward v. Quigley, 257
Iowa 1077, 1087-89, 133 N.W.2d 38, 43-44 (even when value of minority interest is less than average
value per share, minority discount undermines statutory purpose of preventing squeeze-outs), modi-
fied on reh'& 257 Iowa 1104, 136 N.W.2d 280 (1965)
85. Comment, supra note 11, at 147-48.
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If control does not account for the difference in value between ma-
jority and minority shares, dereliction of fiduciary duties must be the
greatest contributor to the gap." Majority shareholders can stray from
their fiduciary obligations because, as currently enforced, such obliga-
tions do not command strict compliance. Since it is both difficult and
expensive for minority shareholders to fight oppression, majority share-
holders will, to some extent, be able to deviate from their fiduciary obliga-
tions.87 In Delaware, for example, if a majority of minority shareholders
vote in favor of a merger and the corporation makes adequate disclosure,
the objecting minority shareholders have the burden of showing that the
transaction was unfair to them.83 As a result, minority shareholders will
not litigate unless they feel relatively certain that they can meet this bur-
den of proof and earn a substantial recovery. This difficulty in enforcing
minority rights, which stems in part from a lack of resources for proving
such breaches of fiduciary duty, allows majority shareholders to divert
corporate benefits to themselves and raise the price of their shares.89
Courts can best guard against oppression of minority shareholders
by setting the fair value of their shares high enough to discourage corpo-
rations from attempting to cash out such shareholders at bargain
prices.90 Courts can accomplish this protection by awarding a pro rata
price in appraisal proceedings. 91 Since shareholders invoking the ap-
praisal remedy can usually allege unfairness,92 an appraisal price that
significantly undervalues minority shares fails to serve its protective pur-
pose.93 A corporation will not negotiate in good faith if the most it has
to lose is the amount of a discounted appraisal price--especially since it
would benefit from any decrease in the value of minority shares. Ironi-
86. But see Andrews, The Stockholder's Right -o Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Share 78
HARv. L REv. 505, 526 (1965) (arguing that control insures an investment by allowing implementa-
tion of new corporate policies).
87. See L SOLOMON, D. ScHwARTZ & J. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 996-97 (2d ed. 1988).
88. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
89. Cf Comment, supra note 11, at 151-52 (describing methods by which majority can engage
in self-dealing; noting that impact of self-dealing on value of shares is not sufficiently clear).
90. See 1 F.H. O'NEAL & R. THOMSON, supra note 4, at § 5.31(C), at 193.
91. See Haynsworth, supra note 36, at 489 (arguing that use of minority discounts could en-
courage majority shareholders to "squeeze[) out" minority).
92. See, ag, Weinberger 457 A.2d at 703 (alleging that elimination of minority shareholders
by cash-out merger was fair); Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 70 N.Y.2d 244, 255, 514 N.E.2d 105, 109,
519 N.Y.S.2d 793, 797 (1987) (alleging unfairly low price in freeze-out merger breaches majority's
fiduciary obligation).
93. The appraisal remedy seeks to protect minority shareholders where a diversion of corporate
wealth is likely. See Fischel, supra note 49, at 876. A finding of majority wrongdoing should not,
however, be a prerequisite for pro rata valuation. See Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 94 Or. App.
195, -, 765 P.2d 207, 215 (1988) (even if no wrongdoing shown, shareholder should not be penal-
ized for exercising rights he has no choice but to exercise).
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cally, courts that allow minority discounts for the sake of "market real-
ity" merely widen the gap between controlling and noncontrolling prices
by limiting the appraisal remedy's ability to deter oppression of minority
shareholders.94
The Weinberger and Revised Model Business Corporation Act valu-
ation standards, by including rescissory damages in the valuation pro-
ceedings, at least partially address concerns about minority oppression.95
Appraisals will include damages to compensate for majority misconduct
"when appropriate to all the issues of fairness." 96 Courts that follow
Weinberger in effect require parties to litigate majority misconduct
within appraisal proceedings.97 Weinberger does not, however, address
the price gap that results from the difficulty of enforcing fiduciary obliga-
tions.98 Courts can protect against such a gap only by awarding minority
shareholders pro rata value as part of the appraisal remedy.
III. PRACTICAL DRAWBACKS OF THE MINoRrrY DISCouNT
A. The Feasibility of the Minority Discount
The minority discount not only undermines the appraisal remedy's
protective aim; it is also difficult to apply. Courts that apply a minority
discount should do so only to the extent that they use either net asset
value or investment value in their valuation, since an "automatic" dis-
count results from the use of market price.99 But courts do not normally
94. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. In the estate and gift tax area, Rev. Rul. 59-60,
1959-1 C.B. 237, allows courts to devalue minority shares in closely held corporations. In such
cases, however, minority shareholders are not coerced into seeking appraisal and thus do not require
the statutory protection given to stockholders dissenting from corporate change. In fact, minority
shareholders in estate and gift tax cases benefit from discounting. See generally Annotation, Valua-
tion of Closely Held Stock for Federal Estate Tax Purposes Under § 2031(b) of Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 (26 USCS § 2031(b)), and Implementing Regulations, 22 A.L.R. FED. 31, 72-74 (1975).
95. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715 (rescissory damages may be appropriate in cases involving
fraud, misrepresentation, deliberate waste, or gross and palpable overreaching by majority); RE-
VISED MODEL Busmiss CORP. Acr §§ 13.01(3), .02(b) (1984) (in computing fair value of dis-
senter's shares courts may consider expected appreciation or depreciation due to the anticipated
corporate action only where inequity would otherwise result; fair value remedy exclusive unless
transaction "unlawful" or "fraudulent"); Herzel & Coling, supra note 43, at 1531 & n.19 (allowing
rescissory damages deters abuse of minority stockholders' rights and creates incentive for electing
appraisal instead of separate lawsuit).
96. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
97. Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 1198, 1209-13, 729 P.2d 683, 690-91, 233 Cal. Rptr.
249, 255-57 (1986).
98. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. When determining an appropriate capitalization
rate for a corporation, courts further complicate discounting by using price-earnings ratios for cor-
porations "comparable" to the corporation at issue. See Haynsworth, supra note 36, at 477. To the
extent that investment value incorporates the market price, that value will, like market price, repre-
sent a "discounted" value.
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use net asset value absent the likelihood of liquidation and pro rata asset
distribution)00 Because an appraisal should give minority shareholders
some value for the possibility of future pro rata distributions,101 a court
would have to speculate about the likelihood of liquidation to determine
the need for, and amount of, any discount. In addition, courts may find
it difficult to differentiate among varying sizes of minority holdings, or
even to determine if controlling and minority interests exist. Minority
shareholders may have a block that, although not controlling, is valued
somewhere between the "marginal" market price and the control price.
In addition, in the case of a corporation in which no one shareholder
held a controlling interest, a court could not justify discounting. 0 2
Even when a court uses only a corporation's investment value to
appraise minority shares, the court must choose an appropriate minority
discount. Courts have not, however, agreed on a clear standard for the
proper discount figure, and they have applied considerably different dis-
counts.'0 3 Discounting thus complicates judicial appraisals, and makes it
even more difficult for private parties to anticipate likely appraisal prices.
Denying a minority discount, on the other hand, comports with fairness,
simplifies the valuation process, and facilitates negotiations between
parties.
B. The Minority Discount and Managerial Discretion to Effect
Corporate Changes
The minority discount does not give majority shareholders an incen-
tive to initiate fundamental corporate changes. Because such changes
bring majority shareholders synergistic benefits that are normally un-
available to dissenting shareholders, 104 majority shareholders will often
100. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
102. See Comment, supra note II, at 140 n.5.
103. S e&, Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222, 232 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (finding
15% discount appropriate although plaintiff's expert advocated discount of up to 90%), aff'1d 734
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1984); Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 461, 475, 630 P.2d 167, 177
(1981) (applying 20% discount). A 1975 survey of tax cases showed that, between 1970 and 1975,
discounts ranged from 15% to 55%, with an average of 34%. See Dant, Courts Increasing Amount
of Discount for a Minority Interest in a Business 43 J. TAX'N 104, 108 (1975).
104. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 73, at 304-05 (discussing synergistic benefits in par-
ent-subsidiary mergers). Some commentators have argued that majority stockholders should share
these benefits, though not necessarily through the appraisal remedy. See, eg., id at 345-46 (fairness
requires that each set of stockholders receive equal return on its contribution to merger); Lome, A
Reappraisal of Fair Shares in Controlled Mergers, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 987 (1978) (arguing that
"fair-share" approach recognizes that directors have competing fiduciary obligations to majority and
minority stockholders and must divide assets in an acceptably fair manner); cf. Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (mandating some sharing of synergistic benefits within appraisal
process, achieved through consideration of all relevant factors).
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find the price of a minority buyout attractive. 0 5 Ordinarily, these syner-
gistic benefits result from economies of scale or more efficient manage-
ment policies. In some instances, the majority may also gain other
benefits from purchasing minority shares. In Dreiseszun v. FLM Indus-
tries, for example, majority shareholders acquired minority stock in or-
der to avoid incurring a tax on corporations with more than 100
stockholders. 06 In any case, a majority shareholder who has purchased
minority shares is no longer "subject to the handicaps of a minority
stockholder" and thus need not acquire the shares at a discount in order
to enjoy the shares' full value. 107
Even if minority shareholders are entitled to a pro rata appraisal
price, the majority's superior resources and bargaining position will mini-
mize the real cost of an appraisal for the majority. The appraisal remedy
exists in order to bring the parties together to negotiate a fair price. The
majority, however, controls the corporate purse strings and normally sets
the terms for the valuation by making an initial offer. Moreover, minor-
ity shareholders are unlikely to press for appraisal when the majority
makes a good faith offer. The minority will prefer to avoid costly litiga-
tion that may yield only minimal real benefit.
IV. THE MARKET EXCEPTION
Almost half of the states provide for a market exception to the ap-
praisal remedy. This exception denies an appraisal to minority share-
holders in a corporation listed on a national exchange or held by more
than a stated number of shareholders.10 8 While not all courts view the
market exception as inconsistent with pro rata valuation,1°9 some argue
that it theoretically supports the "market realism" rationale that they use
to justify the minority discount. These courts rely on the market excep-
tion, as well as their use of market price in valuing shares, to argue that
the appraisal process should aim to discover an actual, active market
value or a hypothetical ("simulated") market value for minority
105. See Fischel, supra note 49, at 886 (arguing that majority shareholders' monopoly over syn-
ergistic benefits encourages them to initiate "value-increasing transactions").
106. 577 S.W.2d 902, 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
107. Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 1086, 133 N.W.2d 38, 42, modified on reh'g, 257
Iowa 1104, 136 N.W.2d 280 (1965); see also Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 94 Or. App. 195,-,7 65
P.2d 207, 214 (1988) (no discount where corporate purchaser not in minority position following
appraisal).
108. See supra note 33.
109. Iowa, Kentucky, and Oregon, all of which have rejected the minority discount, provide for
a market exception. IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.77 (West 1962); Ky. REv. STAT. § 271A.400(3)
(Baldwin 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.554(3) (1988). Mississippi, which allows the minority dis-
count, does not have a market exception. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-13 (Supp. 1988).
Vol. 1989:258]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
shares.' 10
These courts rely on hypothetical market value whenever the fair
value of shares diverges from their market price. This divergence occurs
in two instances. The first and most obvious case is where no active mar-
ket exists for the shares. In this case, valuation of the shares necessarily
requires speculation. A court may know the price at which a small
number of shares traded years ago, but that price does not necessarily
represent the shares' current market price.I1I Second, even when an ac-
tive market does exist, restricted information may cause the shares' fair
value to diverge from the market price:
If the public stock market functioned as a perfect market, where all
actors relied upon complete and accurate information, then courts
would need to look only to the stock market price, and the valuation of
dissenters' shares would be greatly simplified. Unfortunately, a perfect
market is only a theoretical and abstract ideal, and in the real world
the stock market is to varying degrees less than a perfect indicator of
the value of a corporate concern.112
Thus, if an efficient market exists, the valuation price will be the market
price. If no efficient market for the shares exists, courts will apply a hy-
pothetical market standard. 1 3
One court has defined the hypothetical market standard as the price
"a willing seller would take and a willing buyer would give in a free
arm's length transaction in which the parties are informed as to the facts
requisite for a rational judgment." '1 4 Under that standard, a court uses
all of the valuation elements of the Delaware block method or the Wein-
berger standard to obtain a pro rata value for minority shares. 15 Instead
of stopping at this point, however, courts favoring a minority discount
then analogize to the hypothetical market. In finding hypothetical mar-
ket value, these courts consider every factor that could influence market
price, including the marketability of the shares and the minority status of
the holding in question.116 Although these courts accept pro rata value
110. See, e-g., Perlman v. Permanite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222, 229 (N.D. Ind. 1983), aff'dk
734 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1984) (statute requiring courts to determine "the value" of dissenters' shares
means "fair market value");, see also Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 73, at 307 (discussing hypo-
thetical market value in context of parent-subsidiary merger); Seligman, supra note 8, at 837 (argu-
ing that courts should determine "fair value" by using hypothetical free market).
111. See supra note 34. Markets are often thin for the securities of closely held corporations.
112. In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54, 60 (Me. 1979).
113. See.&, i&. (since some market distortion always occurs, every valuation proceeding
should involve mix of factors).
114. Id at 61 n-8. A statute may dictate the willing-seller-willing-buyer standard. See, eg.,
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.85(C) (Anderson 1985).
115. LIbby, 406 A.2d at 61 n.8.
116. See. eg., Perlman v. Permonite Mfg. Co., 568 F. Supp. 222, 232 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (consid-
ering discount for minority interest, lack of marketability, and lack of diversity in determining mar-
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as a useful tool for determining fair value under the appraisal remedy,
they feel bound to recognize market "truths" and discount fair value to
mirror the minority/majority price differential.' 7
These courts argue that they must apply a minority discount in or-
der to avoid the discrepancy in valuation that results from the use of
different valuation methods: net asset and investment value yield a pro
rata appraisal, while market value yields a marginal market appraisal.
According to these courts, minority discounting also avoids the imbal-
ance that results when some dissenters have access to the appraisal rem-
edy and others are left to the "Wall Street rule" because their shares are
in a public company. The argument that the market exception clashes
with pro rata valuation rests on two unstated assumptions: (1) that legis-
latures have authorized a market exception solely to force minority
shareholders to accept the market's "discounted" prices for their shares,
and (2) that individual shares sold on the market reflect a minority
discount.
Both of these assumptions are questionable. First, several practical
considerations would encourage legislatures to rely on the market if the
market were active enough to provide an accurate reflection of a corpora-
tion's value. In the absence of a perfect market, a range of possible valu-
ation figures and methods exist. Courts may, of course, use one of the
cumbersome appraisal calculations to approximate fair value. Some leg-
islatures have believed, however, that an active market could also pro-
vide shareholders with a reasonably fair value for their shares. The
market provides nothing more than an accessible approximation of fair
value, and requiring shareholders to use it conserves judicial resources
ket value), aff'd, 734 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1984); Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 169 Ga.
App. 584, 589-90, 314 S.E.2d 245, 251 (1984) (despite denying determination of hypothetical market
price, court defined "intrinsic worth" to mirror hypothetical market value). Some courts that allow
a marketability discount, however, do not allow a minority discount. See, eg., Ford v. Courier-
Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553, 556-57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); Raskin v. Walter Karl, Inc.,
129 A.D.2d 642, 644, 514 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (1987); Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 139,
149, 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 349 (1985); Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 94 Or. App. 195, -, 765 P.2d
207, 213-14 (1988). If a close corporation's shares are not marketable, its worth as a whole will
decline harming all of the corporation's shareholders. Because of the perceived disadvantages of
lack of control, however, the nomnarketability of a close corporation's shares will most likely injure
minority shareholders more than it will those with majority interests. Nevertheless, courts applying
significant marketability discounts have stated that they are discounting for marketability and not
for minority status. See, eg., In re Fleischer, 107 A.D.2d 97, 101, 486 N.Y.S.2d 272, 275 (1985)
(dissolution action).
117. See, eg., Perlman, 568 F. Supp. at 231-32; Moore v. New Ammest, Inc., 6 Kan. App. '2d
461, 474-75, 630 P.2d 167, 177 (1981). Carried to its logical conclusion, however, this approach no
longer favors a minority discount, since an efficient market operating in compliance with state stan-
dards of fiduciary conduct would value minority and majority shares equally. See supra notes 91-
105 and accompanying text.
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and avoids the hypothesizing of self-serving appraisers.""8 Just because
some appraisal statutes force shareholders to sell their shares in the mar-
ket in certain circumstances does not mean that the goal of the appraisal
process is to duplicate the market or that the market price will always
protect minority shareholders.' 1 9
Second, by holding majority shareholders accountable for minority
oppression, courts will minimize any minority discount or control pre-
mium reflected in the market.' 2" Moreover, because the pro rata price'
derived from a net asset or investment valuation lies between the control-
ling and noncontrolling market prices, the difference between that pro
rata price and the minority market price is even smaller than the minor-
ity/majority differential.
Viewed in this light, the market exception adds certainty to the ap-
praisal process only when the market price approximates fair value. The
exception does not support minority discounting as a second-stage
adjustment.
CONCLUSION
The appraisal remedy grants courts broad authority to award dis-
senting shareholders fair value for their stock. In calculating fair value,
courts can further the aims of dissenters' rights legislation and best guide
private valuation negotiations by rejecting a second-stage minority dis-
count. By rejecting the discount, courts would properly recognize the
appraisal remedy as a quid pro quo for minority shareholders' common
law veto power. More importantly, rejecting a minority discount pro-
tects the minority shareholders' rightful expectations of receiving pro
rata value for their shares. Without the minority discount, the appraisal
remedy more effectively safeguards against bad faith and coercion by ma-
jority shareholders. Moreover, because courts cannot fairly and accu-
rately calculate the minority discount, the discount merely adds
confusion to the already difficult valuation process. Finally, the discount
is unnecessary to preserve management's ability to initiate fundamental
corporate changes. By rejecting the discount, courts would strike an op-
timum balance between flexibility for management and protection for mi-
nority shareholders.
Robert B. Heglar
118. Seligman, supra note 8, at 83-7-38.
119. See Wyss; 94 Or. App. at -, 765 P.2d at 214 (appraisal not designed to produce result
equivalent to sale on open market); see Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 82-85 (recourse to market cannot
adequately protect minority shareholders).
120. See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
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